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Abstract: The paper treats the consumer behavior after the nature of its preferences. There are 
analyzed in terms of Marshall demand, the perfectly substitutable, the perfectly complementary, the 
case of independently goods in the meaning of utility, the case of separable goods in the meaning of 
utility and the neutral goods. Significant for the results is that n goods are treated simultaneously with 
generalized utility functions instead the classical theory. 
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1. Introduction 
The classical theory of consumer’s behavior in relation to the income analyze 
usually the choice’s optimization from a basket of two goods situated in different 
preference relations to each other. 
Although the current theory requires that this onset is sufficient, saying that for a 
good fixed, the basket of other goods can be considered as a whole, we will try to 
impose a new approach, treating each of them individually. 
We believe that this approach is more realistic, because a change in the structure of 
consumption of a good influence on each other goods (with separate prices and 
specific dependency relations). 
In the first part of the article we will briefly review known results on the 
application in Marshallian or Hicksian terms, then we customize and resolve these 
issues for five categories of goods, namely: perfectly substitutable goods, perfectly 
complementary goods, goods independent in the meaning of utility, separable 
goods in the meaning of utility and neutral goods. 
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2. The Marshall Demand 
Let a consumer faced with a choice of any number of quantities of goods B1,...,Bn, 
SC - their space consumption and the sale prices: p1,...,pn. We assume that all 
available income V can be assigned to act consumer buying, his preferences being 
not affected by the size of V. We say, in this case, that the demand for goods is 
unmatched. Let also be a utility function U:SC→R+. Considering the budget zone 
ZB={(x1,...,xn)∈SC∑
=
n
1i
iixp ≤V} we put the problem of determining the 
consumption basket so that utility is maximum. 
The problem becomes: 






∈
≤∑
=
SCn1
n
1i
ii
n1
x,...,x
Vxp
)x,..., U(xmax
 
It can be show that while the function U is concave and SC – convex, then the 
optimal solution of the problem is located on the border zone of the budget, 
satisfying the conditions: 






∈
=∑
=
SCn1
n
1i
ii
n1
x,...,x
Vxp
)x,..., U(xmax
 
The new problem, is therefore to determine the function U extremes when the 
variables are subject to links. We will apply the Lagrange multiplier method. 
Let therefore: L(x1,...,xn,λ)=U(x1,...,xn)+λ 





−∑
=
Vxp
n
1i
ii . The extreme conditions 
are: 






=
∂
∂
==
∂
∂
0
λ
L
n1,i 0,
x
L
i
 
from where: 
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




=−
==λ+
∑
=
0Vxp
n1,i 0,pU
n
1i
ii
ii,m
 
Um,i being the marginal utility corresponding to the i-th good. 
From the first n relations, we deduce λ=
i
i,m
p
U
− , i= n,1  and or otherwise: 
n
n,m
1
1,m
p
U
...
p
U
==  - the Second Law of Gossen 
Solving now the characteristic system: 






=
==
∑
=
Vxp
p
U
...
p
U
n
1i
ii
n
n,m
1
1,m
 
follows the solution of the problem: 





=
=
)V,p,...,p(fx
...
)V,p,...,p(fx
n1nn
n111
 
The restriction of the function U at the hyperplane Vxp
n
1i
ii =∑
=
 has the same nature 
asU, therefore it is concave. As this result, the point ( )n1 x,...,x  is a local 
maximum. 
 
3. The Hicks Demand 
Let now the same consumer who wants a given level of utility in conditions that it 
is willing to allocate the lowest income to achieve its goals. We will say, in this 
case, that the demand for goods is compensated. Considering the utility function 
U:SC→R+ and u  the desired utility, the problem of determining the consumption 
basket so that allocated income be minimum is: 
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






∈
≥
∑
=
SCn1
n1
n
1i
ii
x,...,x
u)x,...,U(x
xp min
 
As in the previous section, we obtain that, while the objective function is linear, it 
is convex, in particular, so the optimal solution of the problem is located on the 
boundary of the zone U(x1,...,xn)≥ u . 
The problem becomes: 







∈
=
∑
=
SCn1
n1
n
1i
ii
x,...,x
u)x,...,U(x
xp min
 
We apply the Lagrange multiplier method again and also, because the objective 
function is linear, it has null second differential and the preferred consumption 
zone of any x∈SC is convex. The restriction of the objective function at 
U(x1,...,xn)= u  is convex, therefore the stationary points of the Lagrangian will be 
points of local minimum. 
Let therefore L(x1,...,xn,λ)=∑
=
n
1i
iixp +λ ( )u)x,...,U(x n1 − . The extreme conditions 
are: 






=
∂
∂
==
∂
∂
0
λ
L
n1,i 0,
x
L
i
 
or: 




=−
==λ+
0u)x,...,U(x
n1,i 0,Up
n1
i,mi
 
From the first n relations, we deduce: 
λ=
i,m
i
U
p
− , i= n,1  
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and or otherwise: 
n
n,m
1
1,m
p
U
...
p
U
==  - the Second Law of Gossen 
Solving now the characteristic system: 





=
==
u)x,...,U(x
p
U
...
p
U
n1
n
n,m
1
1,m
 
follows the solution of the problem: 





=
=
)u,p,...,p(gx~
...
)u,p,...,p(gx~
n1nn
n111
 
The analysis of the two types of demands shows that income hyperplane must be 
tangent to the utility hypersurface. 
Because the tangent hyperplane at an arbitrary point has parameters: Um,1,...,Um,n 
and the hyperplane of income: p1,...,pn, the condition of the problem leads to the 
proportionality of them, so to the Gossen's Second Law. 
Another aspect that deserves to be considered is the economic interpretation of λ 
from the two methods of Lagrange multipliers. 
In the case of Marshall demand, we have dV=∑
=
n
1i
iidxp . On the other hand, from 
Gossen's Second Law: Um,i=-λpi, i= n,1  therefore: -λdV= ∑
=
λ−
n
1i
iidxp =∑
=
n
1i
ii,m dxU
=dU or λ=
dV
dU
− . Therefore, in the case of Marshall demand, λ multiplier is the 
opposite marginal utility of income. 
In the Hicks case, we have dU=∑
=
n
1i
ii,m dxU . Again, from Gossen's Second Law: 
Um,i=-λpi, i= n,1  which implies: dU= ∑
=
λ−
n
1i
iidxp =-λdV hence the same meaning of 
λ. 
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4.1. The Consumer’s Behavior for Perfectly Substitutable Goods 
Let be a lot of goods perfect substitutes B1,...,Bn, SC – their space of consumption 
and sale prices: p1,...,pn. If a consumer has an income V and directs his choice after 
the utility function U(x1,...,xn)=a1x1+...+anxn, ai>0, i= n,1 . 
We put the question of Marshall optimization to maximize the utility. 
We saw in that necessary and sufficient conditions for maximum are: 






=
==
∑
=
Vxp
p
U
...
p
U
n
1i
ii
n
n,m
1
1,m
 
which leads, because Um,i=ai, i= n,1  to: 






=
==
∑
=
Vxp
p
a
...
p
a
n
1i
ii
n
n
1
1
 
Like a conclusion, if 
n
n
1
1
p
a
...
p
a
==  then all the points of the budget  hyperplane 
( )n1 x,...,x  where Vxpn
1i
ii =∑
=
 are optimal components of the consumer basket. 
If ∃i≠j= n,1  so that: 
j
j
i
i
p
a
p
a
≠  then the system is incompatible, so there are no 
solutions inside the budget hyperplane (the zone bounded by the coordinates 
hyperplanes). 
In this case, we consider the comparison of the utility function on the intersection 
between the budget hyperplane and the coordinates hyperplanes. 
Let therefore the partition I={1,...,n}: I=I1∪...∪Ik, Ip∩It=∅ such that ∀u,v∈Ip we 
have: 
v
v
u
u
p
a
p
a
=  and ∀u∈Ip, v∈It, p≠t: 
v
v
u
u
p
a
p
a
≠ . The partition of I consists of sets 
of indices for which ratios are equal. 
Consider now that ∃u∈Ip ∃v∈It with p≠t such that xu≠0 și xv≠0. From the general 
problem of extremes with links, we have: 
v
v
u
u
p
a
p
a
=  that conflicts with Ip∩It=∅. 
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Following these considerations, it follows that if ∃u∈Ip such that xu≠0 then xv=0 
∀v∈I-Ip. In this case, the problem becomes: 





=
∈∀=
∑
∈
Vxp
Iv,u
p
a
p
a
pIu
uu
p
v
v
u
u
 
with the optimal solution ( )
pIuu
x
∈
 consisting of all data points locus given by 
Vxp
pIu
uu =∑
∈
, the maximum utility being: U= ∑
∈ pIu
uuxa . Comparing the maximum 
utility values, corresponding to all elements of partition, we obtain the optimal 
consumption basket. This problem is very simple. Thus, noting λp=
u
u
p
a
 ∀u∈Ip we 
have au=λppu therefore U= ∑
∈
λ
pIu
uup xp =λpV. From these facts, we will get the 
maximum utility for λp=maximum. We then compare the values of λp for each of 
the elements of the partition of I, the corresponding locus being Vxp
pIu
uu =∑
∈
 
corresponding to p such that λp=maximum. 
In particular, for two perfectly substitutable goods, we have: 
2
2
1
1
p
a
p
a
= . If this 
condition occurs, then the optimal consumption basket is given by pairs: ( )21 x,x  
where Vxp
n
1i
ii =∑
=
. If 
2
2
1
1
p
a
p
a
≠  we have the following situations: 
• 
1
1
p
a
>
2
2
p
a
 involves the optimal consumption basket: ( )21 x,x = 





0,
p
V
1
; 
• 
1
1
p
a
<
2
2
p
a
 involves optimal consumption basket: ( )21 x,x = 





2p
V
,0 . 
 
4.2. The Consumer’s Behavior for Perfectly Complementary Goods 
In the case of perfectly complementary goods, we have: 
U(x1,...,xn)=min(a1x1,...,anxn), ai>0, i= n,1 . 
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Let the budget hyperplane: Vxp
n
1i
ii =∑
=
 and U0>0 – fixed. 
Let consider now the point x = ( )n1 x,...,x  for which: a1 1x =... =an nx =U0. 
We have therefore U ( )n1 x,...,x =U0. The condition that x  to be on the budget 
hyperplane is: Vxp
n
1i
ii =∑
=
 or otherwise: VU
a
pn
1i
0
i
i
=∑
=
 where: U0=
∑
=
n
1i i
i
a
p
V
. 
Let then show that if (x1,...,xn) belongs to the budget hyperplane, then the 
maximum utility is U0=
∑
=
n
1i i
i
a
p
V
 and is obtained for x = ( )n1 x,...,x  where 
∑
=
=
n
1i i
i
j
j
a
p
a
V
x , j= n,1 . 
Let therefore Vxp
n
1i
ii =∑
=
 or else: Vx
a
p
a
n
1i
i
i
i
i =∑
=
 and note, for the simplicity: 
i
i
a
p
=qi and aixi=yi. We have: Vyq
n
1i
ii =∑
=
. Suppose now that ∃1≤i≤n such that yi≠
∑
=
n
1i
iq
V
 
If yi≥
∑
=
n
1i
iq
V
, i= n,1  then: VVq
q
1
q
VqyqV
n
1i
in
1i
i
n
1i
n
1i
i
i
n
1i
ii ==≥= ∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
=
=
 from where: 
yi=
∑
=
n
1i
iq
V
, i= n,1  - contradiction. 
Therefore: ∃1≤j≤n such that: yi<
∑
=
n
1i
iq
V
. In this case: aixi=yi<
∑
=
n
1i
iq
V
 where: 
U(x1,...,xn)=min(a1x1,...,anxn)<
∑
=
n
1i
iq
V
=U0. 
After these facts, we obtain that any point on the budget hyperplane different from 
x  will have a lower utility. 
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In particular, for two perfectly complementary goods, we have: 






+
=
2
2
1
1
1
1
a
p
a
p
a
V
x =
1221
2
apap
Va
+
 and 






+
=
2
2
1
1
2
2
a
p
a
p
a
V
x =
1221
1
apap
Va
+
 
 
4.3. The Consumer’s Behavior in the Case of Goods Independent in the 
Meaning of Utility 
In the case of this type of goods, the utility function is: 
U(x1,...,xn)=f1(x1)+...+fn(xn) with fi∈C2(0,∞), if ′′ ≤0, i= n,1  and f1(0)+...+fn(0)=0 
Because Um,i= )x(f i'i , i= n,1 , the necessary and sufficient conditions are: 






=
==
∑
=
Vxp
p
)x(f
...
p
)x(f
n
1i
ii
n
n
'
n
1
1
'
1
 
In the particular case of a utility function of the form: 
U(x1,x2,...,xn)= n21 n21 x...xx ααα +++  with αi∈(0,1), i= n,1  
we have: 






=
α
==
α
∑
=
−α−α
Vxp
p
x
...
p
x
n
1i
ii
n
1
nn
1
1
11
n1
 
Noting with λ the common values of the ratios, we get: xi=
1
1
i
i
ip −α





 λ
α
, 
i= n,1 . From the income relationship: Vpp
n
1i
1
1
i
i
i
i
=




 λ
α
∑
=
−α
 where: 
Vp 1
1
n
1i 1
1
i
1
i i
i
i
i
=λ
α
−α
=
−α
−α
α
∑  
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If λ  is a strictly positive solution of this equation, then the final solution is: xi=
1
1
i
i
ip −α





 λ
α
, i= n,1 . 
 
4.4. The Consumer’s Behavior in the case of Separable Goods in the Meaning 
of Utility 
The separable utility function for such goods is: 
U(x1,...,xn)=f1(x1)⋅...⋅fn(xn) with fi∈C2(0,∞), fi(x)>0 ∀x>0, 
if ′′ ≤0, i= n,1 , f1(0)⋅...⋅fn(0)=0 
and the quadratic form: H= ∑∑
==
ξξ′′+ξ′′ n
1j,i
ji
ji
jin
1i
2
i
i
i
ff
ff
f
f
 is negatively defined. 
 The necessary and sufficient conditions for maximum are: 







=
′
==
′
∑
=
Vxp
p
f
fU
...
p
f
fU
n
1i
ii
n
n
n
1
1
1
 
or otherwise: 






=
′
==
′
∑
=
Vxp
fp
f
...
fp
f
n
1i
ii
nn
n
11
1
 
In the particular case of the Cobb-Douglas function: 
U(x1,x2,...,xn)= n1 n1 x...x αα , αi>0, ∑
=
α
n
1i
i ≤1 
we have: 






=
α
==
α
∑
=
Vxp
xp
...
xp
n
1i
ii
nn
n
11
1
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Noting with λ the common value of the ratios, we get: pixi= λ
α i
, i= n,1  hence from 
the equality of the budget: V
n
1i
i
=
λ
α
∑
=
 that is: λ= 
V
n
1i
i∑
=
α
, Finally we get: xj=
∑
=
α
α
n
1i
ij
j
p
V
, j= n,1 . 
 
4.5. The consumer’s Behavior in the Case Neutral Goods 
In the case of neutral goods B1,...,Bm, the utility function is: 
U(x1,...,xn)=f(xm+1,...,xn) 
where f is of class C2 and concave. Because in the budget hyperplane: Vxp
n
1i
ii =∑
=
 
the neutral goods consumed financial resources without to bring more utility, the 
optimal allocation will exclude from the analysis and the optimization problem 
becomes: 







=
∂
∂
==
∂
∂
∑
+=
+
+
Vxp
p
x
f
...
p
x
f
n
1mi
ii
n
n
1m
1m
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The results obtained from the above analysis provides the optimal allocation of the 
demand of Marshall type, pointing out that in the case of perfectly substitutable 
goods proportionality coefficient the allocation depends of the proportionality of 
the coefficients of the utility function with goods prices. 
If for perfectly complementary goods the issue is resolved completely, in the case 
of goods independent in the meaning of utility, the problem reduces to solving a 
nonlinear equation whose solution determines the actual allocation. 
The last two issues of a general nature, specifically formulated the optimal 
conditions.  
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